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Abstract. This paper reports data from three subject pools (n=717 subjects) using techniques 
based on those of Loewenstein, et al. (1989) and Blanco, et al. (2011) to obtain parameters, 
respectively, of stated and revealed inequality aversion.  We provide a replication opportunity 
for those papers, with two innovations: (i) a design which allows stated and revealed 
preferences to be compared at the individual level; (ii) assessment of robustness of findings 
across subjects from a UK university, a Turkish university and Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
Our findings on stated aversion to inequality are qualitatively similar to those of 
Loewenstein, et al. in each of our subject pools, whereas there are notable differences 
between some of our findings on revealed preference and those of Blanco, et al.  We find that 
revealed advantageous inequality aversion is often stronger than revealed dis-advantageous 
inequality aversion.  In most subject pools, we find some (weak) correlation between 
corresponding parameters of stated and revealed inequality aversion.         
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1. Introduction 
Inequality aversion, the dislike of unequal outcomes, has become established as one of 
the core postulates of behavioural economics. Although discussion of equity concerns is by 
no means new (e.g., Adams 1965; Selten 1978), the recent literature took off with publication 
of formal models of inequality averse preferences by Bolton (1991), Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), with the latter paper providing the most widely applied 
model.  In this paper, we are concerned with the range of empirically relevant parameters of 
inequality aversion. We concentrate on aversion to inequality in bilateral monetary 
comparisons, as in Fehr and Schmidt’s theory.   
To our knowledge, Loewenstein, et al. (1989) is the first paper to provide systematic 
evidence on this. They presented their subjects with (hypothetical) life-like scenarios that 
involved distributions of money between the subject and a comparator and asked the subjects 
to rate their satisfaction with those distributions.  We refer to these measurements as stated 
preferences because they do not involve choices, but un-incentivized assessments of 
satisfaction.  On the basis of these ratings, Loewenstein, et al. estimated ‘social utility 
functions’ and found that subjects dislike inequality when it is to their advantage and when it 
is to their disadvantage. However, aversion to disadvantageous inequality was considerably 
stronger than aversion to advantageous inequality.  Fehr and Schmidt use this observation 
(pp. 821, 823-4) to justify their distinctive assumption that disadvantageous inequality 
aversion (measured in their model by a parameteUFDOOHGĮLVDWOHDVWDVVWURQJas 
advantageous inequality aversion (measured by a parameter called ȕ  A key subsequent step 
taken by Blanco, et al. (2011) was to provide individual-level measures of ĮDQGȕ, 
respectively, by using subjects’ choices in two particular games.  Thus, importantly, their 
measures of the parameters reflect revealed preferences, in the traditional sense.     
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In this paper, we replicate the Loewenstein, et al. experiments using updated versions of 
their scenarios to elicit social utility functions; and we replicate Blanco, et al.’s measurement 
RIĮDQGȕXVing their games and procedures.1 In the latter case, like Blanco, et al., we will 
REVHUYHWKHMRLQWGLVWULEXWLRQRIĮDQGȕ and so be able to reassess the extent to which elicited 
values are consistent with Fehr and Schmidt’s asVXPSWLRQWKDWĮȕ. However, our most 
novel contribution is that we link stated and revealed inequality aversion at the individual 
level: for each subject, our experimental design yields parameters of stated disadvantageous 
and advantageous inequality aversion obtained with methods akin to those of Loewenstein, et 
al., and YDOXHVRIĮDQGȕUHYHDOHGE\FKRLFHV using Blanco, et al.’s methods.  As they refer to 
the same inequalities but are obtained with different methods, we use a and b to denote the 
stated SUHIHUHQFHDQDORJXHVRIĮDQGȕUHVSHFWLYHO\.     
If inequality aversion is a general sentiment triggered across different situations, then 
stated and revealed measures should be positively correlated across individuals.  If they are, 
measurements of stated and revealed preferences cross-validate each other.  If they are not, 
this would call into question how strongly the findings of Loewenstein, et al. could support 
the modelling assumptions of Fehr and Schmidt.   
We also investigate the association between inequality aversion and proneness to guilt, 
which we measure using the GASP (guilt and shame proneness) scale of Cohen, et al. (2011). 
This is particularly relevant to aversion to advantageous inequality, the parameter of which 
(here b or Ⱦ) is often referred to as the “guilt” parameter (e.g., Blanco, et al., p. 322). 
Our data are from three subject pools, two of them drawn from the student bodies of the 
University of Nottingham (UK) and Izmir University of Economics (Turkey) and the third 
                                                            
1 We are aware of three further studies, by Dannenberg, et al. (2007), Dannenberg, et al. (2012), and Teyssier 
(2012), that elicit revealed preferences using methods akin to Blanco, et al. but with research questions distinct 
from ours.  We are not aware of previous replications of Loewenstein, et al.’s seminal work.  
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from the American online workforce of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
2
 Across all 
subject pools, 717 people participated in our experiments. Apart from differences pertaining 
to the subject pools, the experimental procedures were essentially uniform.   
Our main results are as follows. Notwithstanding some differences in intensity, stated 
inequality averse preferences are qualitatively similar in all three subject pools in that, like 
Loewenstein, et al., we find that DE and b for most subjects. This provides strong 
support for the findings of Loewenstein, et al. that inspired Fehr and Schmidt’s theory. 
However, the support for some aspects of that theory itself is weaker, as we find violations at 
the individual and the median level in all subject pools RIWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWĮȕWe find 
only weak positive correlation between a DQGĮ.  Correlation between b DQGȕis significantly 
positive and exceeds that for a DQGĮ in all subject pools. We find females are more averse 
than males to advantageous inequality and that there is an association between inequality 
aversion and the GASP measure of proneness to guilt and shame.  Although there are some 
differences between our findings from different subject pools, they are mostly not important 
for central tendencies of parameters, especially once other factors are controlled for.  
 
2.  Methods 
For brevity, we focus in this section on the main features of our experimental designs, 
relegating technical and procedural details, instructions and scenario texts to the online 
supplementary materials.  Each subject completed all of the game tasks described in this 
section, a selection of scenario tasks, the GASP task and some other tasks with no feedback 
until all tasks had been completed.  We describe the games here in terms of “points”, as we 
did to subjects.  At the end of the experiment, points from one game were converted to cash. 
                                                            
2 MTurk is an online labor market. Horton, et al. (2011) discusses its usefulness for experimental economics.  A 
more sceptical view is expressed by Chandler, et al. (2014).    
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The core of this study is the two-person version of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of 
inequality aversion: 
௜ܷ = ݔ௜ െ ߙ௜ max ൛ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ , 0ൟ െ ߚ௜ max ൛ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ , 0ൟ, ݆ ് ݅,  ߙ௜ ൒ ߚ௜; 1 > ߚ௜ ൒ 0.        (1) 
In this functional form, ௜ܷ denotes person i’s utility, ݔ௜ person i’s monetary payoff and ݔ௝ 
the other person’s monetary payoff. The parameter ߙ௜ governs i’s disutility from 
disadvantageous inequality, i.e. from ݔ௜ falling short of ݔ௝; and the parameter ߚ௜ governs i’s 
disutility from advantageous inequality, i.e. from ݔ௜ exceeding ݔ௝. A core assumption of Fehr 
and Schmidt is that advantageous inequality has less of a negative impact on overall utility 
than disadvantageous inequality of the same magnitude, i.e. ߙ௜ ൒ ߚ௜. A central goal of our 
paper is to provide fresh estimates of the MRLQWGLVWULEXWLRQRIĮi and ߚ௜.  
A subject’s parameter ߚ௜ of advantageous inequality aversion is elicited using a Modified 
Dictator game that Blanco, et al. introduced and which we implement in the same way.  The 
dictator has to make 21 decisions, each a choice between the distribution (20 points for self, 0 
points for other) and an equal distribution (x points for self, x points for other), where “other” 
refers to a passive player.  The equal distributions increased in increments of 1 point from (0, 
0) to (20, 20) in the obvious notation.  As explained by Blanco, et al. (p. 325-326), the 
dictator’s  ߚ௜ parameter is theoretically determined by the equal distribution (ݔ෤௜, ݔ෤௜) which he 
regards as good as the distribution (20, 0).  From equation (1), ௜ܷ(20, 0) = ௜ܷ(ݔ෤௜, ݔ෤௜) if, and 
only if, 20 െ 20ߚ௜ = ݔ෤௜. Thus, 
ߚ௜ = 1 െ ௫ഢ෥ଶ଴ . 
Following Blanco, et al., we assume that, as x rises in steps, subjects will switch (once) from 
choosing (20, 0) over (x, x) to making the opposite choice; and, given this, we approximate ݔ෤௜ 
as the average of the highest x for which (20, 0) is chosen and the lowest x for which (x, x) is 
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chosen. ߚ௜ = 1 (resp. 0) is assigned to a subject who always (resp. never) chooses the equal 
option.    
Following Blanco, et al. (p. 325) (and in line with a suggestion of Fehr and Schmidt) 
behavior in the Ultimatum game of Güth, et al. (1982) can be XVHGWRHOLFLWWKHSDUDPHWHUĮi of 
revealed disadvantageous inequality aversion.  One player (the proposer) proposes to the 
other player (the responder) an allocation of a fixed sum (here of 20 points).  Then, the 
responder chooses between accepting the proposal and rejecting it.  In the former case, the 
proposal is implemented; but, in the latter case, both participants receive 0 points. All 
subjects make decisions in both roles, using the strategy method for the responder’s decision, 
so as to provide a response to all distributions that might be proposed.  
A subject’s strategy in the role of responder yields an estimate of their ߙ௜ parameter.  
This is determined theoretically by the proposal ݏǁ௜ at which the responder is just indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting.  From (1), ௜ܷ(ݏǁ௜ , 20 െ ݏǁ௜) = ݏǁ௜ െ ߙ௜(20 െ ݏǁ௜ െ ݏǁ௜) = 0 
determines the point of indifference, and thus,  
ߙ௜ = ௦ǁ೔ଶ(ଵ଴ି௦ǁ೔). 
Following Blanco, et al., when there is no more than one switch-point in the responder’s 
strategy, we approximate ݏǁ௜ with the average of the lowest accepted offer and the highest 
rejected offer.  Subjects who do not reject any offers are assigned ߙ௜ = 0 and those who 
reject all offers less favorable to them than an equal split are assigned ߙ௜ =  4.5 (Blanco, et 
al., p. 325).  
Our elicitation of ߙ௜ and ߚ௜ relies on subject i “switching” no more than once in the 
relevant sequence of choices for each parameter.  Following Blanco, et al., any subject who 
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switched multiple times in either of these sequences, and is thus not well behaved, is 
excluded from the data reported in Section 3.       
We turn now to the elicitation of stated preferences.  In Studies 1 & 2 of Loewenstein, 
et al. (1989), participants read various scenarios describing a range of possible distributions 
of outcomes, with the subject in the role of one of the affected parties in a bilateral dispute. 
Subjects ranked their satisfaction of outcomes on an 11-point scale. In our study, we follow 
the design of Loewenstein, et al., but use modernized scenario tasks. This part of the design is 
2×2×2, varying the nature of the issue disputed (distributing the proceeds of an invention or 
of a plot of land between two parties), the prior relationship between the two parties (positive 
or negative), and whether it is gains or losses which are to be distributed. Thus, in total there 
are eight different scenarios. For each one, the task is to rate 21 distributions of payoffs for 
the subject and the other person described in the scenario. Each subject was presented with 
four different scenarios.  For each subject, the resulting 84 ratings are used to estimate a 
“social utility” function of the same form as (1) (plus the addition of a constant) to obtain 
estimates of their stated advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion parameters 
(called ai and bi).  The estimation used OLS, with the subject’s stated satisfaction as the 
dependent variable.  By construction, this procedure produces a value of ai and a value of bi 
for each subject but, as explained above, subjects with non-well-behaved revealed 
preferences are excluded from Section 3. This guarantees that the revealed and stated 
preferences reported are drawn from the same set of subjects.        
Though we may expect positive rank correlation across individuals between ܽ௜ and ߙ௜ 
(resp. between ܾ௜ and ߚ௜) if inequality aversion is a general sentiment across domains, the 
presence of such correlation is certainly not built in to the design.  The scenario tasks and the 
games are quite different from one another: for example, only the latter are incentivised, the 
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response modes are not the same, and the contexts described in the scenarios differ from 
those posed by the game instructions.  
We are interested in the generalizability across subject pools of the findings on stated 
and revealed inequality aversion.  Replication in a culturally different society and outside the 
university environment is important because there is mounting evidence that student subjects 
from European or North American universities often are quite special, when compared to 
others (Henrich, et al. 2010; Barr, et al. 2009; Herrmann, et al. 2008).      
We conducted sessions at the University of Nottingham (n=104 students, all British); 
at Izmir University of Economics (n=206 students, all Turkish); and on the MTurk platform 
(n= 407 adult residents of the US). Culturally, there is significant distance between the UK 
and Turkey; and the MTurk sample differs from both university samples, especially by 
having greater variety of ages and education levels, and by being American.  
In both university samples, the experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007) 
using, in the case of the games, zTree code and instructions provided by Blanco, et al..  In 
Nottingham, recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner 2004).  In Izmir, recruiting 
required approaching students on campus. The MTurk experiments were conducted using the 
online survey software Qualtrics and the MTurk platform. In all cases, the experiments were 
followed by post-experimental questionnaires, which elicited socio-demographic information, 
as well as the measure of guilt and shame proneness (Cohen, et al. 2011). 
3.  Results 
3.1. Stated inequality aversion 
Our first result concerns the ai and bi parameters of stated inequality aversion derived 
from the scenarios.  We constructed the social utility curves of Figure 1A by averaging the ai 
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and bi parameters across each subject pool (and normalizing the constant to zero).  Fig. 1A 
shows averaged utility as a function of the difference between Own and Others payoff, when 
one’s own payoff is zero.  In all three of our subject pools, averaged utility is positively 
sloped in the region of disadvantageous inequality (to the left of zero on the horizontal axis) 
and negatively sloped in the region of advantageous inequality.  Also, in all three of our 
subject pools and in line with Loewenstein, et al., the slope of averaged utility is greater in 
absolute value in the former region than in the latter, implying that disadvantageous 
inequality had a greater negative impact on satisfaction ratings than the corresponding 
advantageous inequality. 
Fig. 1A also shows that, especially in the region of advantageous inequality, the averaged 
social utility curves of the Nottingham and Izmir subject pools are quite similar to one 
another and to corresponding curves from the Loewenstein, et al. findings (see online 
materials).  In contrast, the averaged social utility curves from the MTurk sample show more 
pronounced aversion to both forms of inequality.  Kruskal-Wallis tests confirm that there are 
statistically significant differences between our subject pools in bi values Ȥ2(2)=8.779, 
p=0.0124) and, especially, in ai values Ȥ2(2)=23.858, p<0.001), an issue to which we return 
in Section 3.4.   
FIGURES 1A- 1D 
Figs. 1B to 1D illustrate the joint ai and bi distributions for each of our subject pools. 
Recall that a key assumption of Fehr and Schmidt is that ߙ௜ ൒ ߚ௜ which they justify referring 
to the Loewenstein, et al results.  In our notation, the corresponding finding to that of 
Loewenstein, et al. would be tendency for ai to exceed bi.  We find strong support for this, as 
ai  bi for 87%, 77%, and 80% of participants in the Nottingham, Izmir, and MTurk subject 
pools, respectively.  However, a non-trivial minority (35%, 32% and 24% respectively) 
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violate the condition bi VRGLVSOD\LQJ a stated preference for advantageous inequality.  
This finding is consistent with observation of the existence of spiteful preferences in related 
literature (e.g., Balafoutas et al., 2012; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2013). 
Figures 1B–1D also report that ai and bi are positively correlated across individuals in 
each subject pool.  In the pooled data, the corresponding Spearman rho is 0.3784  (p<0.0001). 
3.2. Revealed inequality aversion 
Table 1 shows the distribution of ߙ௜ (top panel) and ߚ௜ (lower panel) for each subject 
pool, using the categories of Blanco, et al.’s Table 2.  We compare our observed distributions 
to Blanco, et al.’s interpretation (p. 326) of the distribution which Fehr and Schmidt deem 
plausible and to the distributions which Blanco, et al. themselves observe. Table 1 reports the 
relevant Chi
2
-tests in each case, as well as the mean, median and standard deviation of each 
parameter in each subject pool.   
TABLE 1 
The upper panel of Table 1 reveals that, in all three of our subject pools, values of Įi in 
the range of Įi < 0.4 are substantially more frequent than in the Blanco, et al. data (between 
46% and 59% of our subjects have an Įi < 0.4, compared to 31% in Blanco, et al.).  Values of 
Įi DUHZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRI1RWWLQJKDPDOVRPRUHIUHTuent in our subject pools than in 
the Blanco, et al. data (7%, 24%, and 17%, in Nottingham, Izmir, and MTurk, respectively, 
compared to 13% in Blanco, et al.). Chi
2
-tests confirm that
 
all three of our subject pools differ 
significantly (at p=0.03 or lower) LQUHVSHFWRIĮi from both the Fehr and Schmidt and the 
Blanco, et al. distributions of this parameter.   
In contrast, our distributions of ߚ௜ values appear similar to Blanco, et al.’s findings. Chi2-
tests find no significant difference from the distribution of ߚ௜ values reported by Blanco, et al. 
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in our Nottingham and MTurk samples (p=0.26 and 0.21, respectively), and only a weakly 
significant difference in the Izmir sample (p=0.08). Comparing our distributions to those 
assumed by Fehr and Schmidt, using Chi
2
-tests, reveals significantly different distributions in 
the Izmir and MTurk sample (p<0.01), but an insignificant difference between the Fehr-
Schmidt distribution and that of our Nottingham sample (p=0.15).  
Our next result concerns Fehr and Schmidt’s assumption that ߙ௜ ൒ ߚ௜.  A first, aggregate 
level, take is provided by comparing the means and medians documented in Table 1. We find 
WKDWWKHPHDQYDOXHRIĮi is indeed larger than the mean ߚ௜ in all our subject pools (as in 
Blanco, et al.). However, the medLDQĮi is lower than the median  ߚ௜ in all our subject pools 
(unlike in Blanco, et al.).   
Table 1 also shows notable variation in the percent of 'well-behaved' participants (as 
defined above) in each subject pool. In the Blanco, et al. subject pool, 85% of participants 
were well-behaved. Our Nottingham and MTurk subject pools displayed similar percentages 
of well-behaved participants (82% and 90% respectively), but only 45% of our Izmir sample 
met the criteria of well-behavedness.     
The four panels of Fig. 2 give the joint Įi, ߚ௜) distributions for the Blanco, et al. subject 
pool and for each of our subject pools. As was foreshadowed in the medians, we see many 
violations of the assumption that Įi  ߚ௜ in our subject pools. Whereas Blanco, et al. reported 
38% of their participants violating this assumption, we find 55%, 59%, and 51% of 
participants violating it in Nottingham, Izmir, and MTurk, respectively. Like Blanco, et al., 
ZHDOVRILQGWKDWĮi and ߚ௜ are uncorrelated in Nottingham and Izmir; in the MTurk sample 
WKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQĮi and ߚ௜ is slightly (but significantly) negative.  In the pooled data, 
the correlation is very slightly negative (rho = - 0.089; p=0.038). 
FIGURE 2 
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3.3 Relationship between stated and revealed preferences 
Fig. 3 shows the joint distribution of ܽ௜ (stated) and ߙ௜(revealed) parameters of 
disadvantageous inequality aversion for each subject pool, with the associated Spearman’s 
rho and its significance level.  Surprisingly, there is no significant correlation between ܽ௜ and ߙ௜ in the Izmir pool; and, though the correlation is statistically significant in the other two 
pools, it is only rather weakly positive, especially in the MTurk sample.  In the pooled data, 
the correlation is slightly positive (rho = 0.132; p=0.002).   
FIGURE 3 
The corresponding materials for the joint distribution of ܾ௜ (stated) and ߚ௜ (revealed) 
parameters of advantageous inequality aversion are shown in Fig. 4.  For these parameters, 
the correlation is positive and statistically significant in all three subject pools.  The degree of 
correlation is still quite modest, but higher in each subject pool than for ܽ௜ and ߙ௜. In the 
pooled data, the correlation is moderately positive (rho = 0.2785; p<0.001).  
FIGURE 4 
3.4 The role of socio-demographics and guilt proneness for inequality aversion 
Finally, we pool the data from all three subject pools and separately regress our four 
measures of inequality aversion (ai, biĮiȕi) on three standard socio-demographic variables – 
namely age, a female dummy, and a dummy for having some post-secondary education – and 
on a dummy for having studied Economics or Business, the GASP scale, and on dummies for 
Izmir and MTurk (the Nottingham subject pool being the omitted category).  Across all our 
subject pools there is considerable age variation (18-75 years), largely due to the MTurk 
population. Between 41% and 46% of participants were females, across the three subject 
pools. All our university student subjects and 82% of the MTurk workers have post-
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secondary education status, with 5% having studied Economics and 12% Business.  Table 2 
records the results of the regressions. 
TABLE 2 
Age is a significant predictor of stated inequality aversion of both forms, but not of the 
corresponding revealed preference parameters.    Compared with males, females state slightly 
stronger aversion to disadvantageous inequality aversion, but show significantly higher 
estimates for stated and revealed advantageous inequality aversion. This result is consistent 
with the experimental evidence that females give more than men in dictator games (e.g., 
Eckel and Grossman 1998; Engel 2011). Participants who had studied either Economics or 
Business showed marginally significantly lower aversion to advantageous inequality (for 
Economics in revealed preference but for Business in stated preference).  Finally, with the 
exception of Įi, all inequality aversion parameters are highly significantly positively 
correlated with GASP (higher scores indicate a greater proneness towards guilt and shame). 
The remaining subject pool difference that stands out once all these factors are controlled for 
is that Izmir subjects have significantly lower values of ܽ௜. 
 
4.  Discussion and conclusion 
In terms of replication, our main results are as follows.  The qualitative findings of 
Loewenstein, et al. appear rather robust in that the central tendencies of our stated preference 
data, in each subject pool, support the hypothesis of aversion to advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality, with the latter the more keenly felt.  Thus, these findings 
reinforce one of the main ingredients of Fehr and Schmidt’s motivation for their model.  In 
contrast, our findings on revealed preferences conform less closely to the assumptions of 
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Fehr and Schmidt’s model and to the findings of Blanco, et al., whose revealed preference 
techniques we use.  We find widespreaGYLRODWLRQRI)HKUDQG6FKPLGW¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWĮi  ߚ௜.  Although our results on the distribution of the parameter ߚ௜ of aversion to advantageous 
inequality are similar to the corresponding findings of Blanco, et al., our distributions of the 
parameter ߙ௜ of disadvantageous inequality aversion that differ markedly from that observed 
by Blanco, et al.  Compared with them, we find a notably larger proportion of low values of 
the parameter in all of our subject pools; and also a larger proportion of high values of the 
parameter, in particular in our Izmir sample.   
Below, we comment further on two of our most striking findings - weak correlation 
between stated and revealed preferences and the frequent violation of Fehr and Schmidt’s 
assumption WKDWĮi   ߚ௜, just mentioned – and on differences between our subject pools.     
We observe statistically significant positive rank correlations across individuals between 
(stated) ܾ௜ and (revealed) ߚ௜ parameters of advantageous inequality aversion in all three of 
our subject pools; and between (stated) ܽ௜ and (revealed) ߙ௜ parameters of disadvantageous 
inequality aversion in two of those pools.
3
  But, in all six cases, Spearman’s rho was below 
0.32, suggesting only a weak relationship.  We can think of three possible reactions to this. 
One perspective (provided by a referee) is that difference between stated and revealed 
preferences is an indication of “hypothetical bias” in the former, arising perhaps because 
subjects do not take un-incentivized tasks seriously or use them to indulge in cheap talk.  A 
second perspective (provided by another referee) is that the difference between stated and 
revealed preferences, combined with greater conformity of the former to theoretical 
predictions, indicates that the scenario tasks “work” better, perhaps because subjects find 
                                                            
3
  It is interesting that the correlation is stronger between the “pro-social” parameters ߚ௜ and bi.  Studies which 
report correlation across games between different measures of revealed pro-sociality include (e.g., Yamagishi, et 
al. (2013), Dariel and Nikiforakis (2014), Peysakhovich, et al. (2014)).   
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them more recognizable or accessible than the stripped-down lab games.  A third perspective 
is that the scenario tasks and the laboratory games both “work”, but they measure slightly 
different things - in one case, an attitude and, in the other case, willingness to take a certain 
kind of action.  These are correlated because there is an underlying propensity to act on ones 
attitudes.  But, the correlation need not be strong, for example if the propensity to act on ones 
attitudes is itself a trait whose strength varies across individuals. 
To elaborate, the satisfaction ratings of the scenario tasks may indicate subjects’ 
happiness with (or feelings about) different outcomes, whereas the Modified Dictator and 
Ultimatum games indicate subjects’ willingness to sacrifice monetary payoffs in order to 
change the payoff of the other player in the game.  This perspective chimes with the 
discussion of Blanco, et al. (Section 7) of their finding that the Fehr-Schmidt model, taken 
with parameter values elicited with their revealed preference methods, predicts the play of 
games other than those used in the elicitation less successfully at the individual level than at 
the aggregate level.  They point out that willingness to give up money in order to change the 
other players’ payoff may be sensitive to the nature of the game, as well as to the type of 
inequality faced. 
These considerations are also relevant to our findings about the relative strength of 
aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.  Even if adherence to some ethical 
codes might induce the opposite attitude, we would expect most subjects to be happier on 
receiving the larger part of some given unequal allocation between two people than on when 
receiving the smaller part.  If the satisfaction ratings of our scenario tasks are indicators of 
happiness, in this sense, then our stated preference findings strongly support this expectation.  
In contrast, our finding that a majority of subjects violate the assumption WKDWĮi   ߚ௜ is a 
matter of revealed preferences.  Viewed more narrowly, it is a matter of the trade-offs that 
subjects are willing to make in two particular games. 
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A subject assigned a low value of ߙ௜ is one who is reluctant to leave positive offers on 
the table when playing as respondent in the Ultimatum game.  We report more instances of 
this than most previous studies, but reluctance to leave money on the table is not completely 
counter-intuitive behavior, even for a subject who feels unhappy about getting less than the 
proposer.  And, of course, homo economicus has Įi = 0. 
In the Modified Dictator game with which ߚ௜ is elicited, our findings are comparable 
with those of Blanco, et al..  Mean values of around 0.5 seem quite high (especially relative 
to homo economicus), but the discussion of Blanco, et al. (p. 333) suggests a possible reason 
for this shared finding.  The active player may feel responsible for the passive player in the 
Modified Dictator game; and looking out for that player’s interests would tend to boost the 
elicited value of ߚ௜, even for a subject who would not put much weight on the payoff of 
another in different circumstances.    
7KHVHDUJXPHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWWDNHQRQLWVRZQDILQGLQJWKDWVRPHLQGLYLGXDOYLRODWHVĮi 
  ߚ௜ may not be all that surprising, when one keeps in mind that the condition is on revealed 
preference.  Nevertheless, we find more frequent violations than Blanco, et al. had, and this 
was contrary to our expectations.  Further studies would be useful, especially in non-standard 
subject pools. 
That said, the similarities between our findings from distinct subject pools are arguably 
more striking than the differences, with two exceptions each of which relates to revealed 
preference.  The first is the much greater incidence of non-well-behaved responses to the 
revealed preference tasks in Izmir than in the other two subject pools.  The second is greater 
incidence among well-behaved subjects of extreme values (high and low) of ߙ௜ among the 
Izmir subject pool, as compared with Nottingham and MTurk.  One possible interpretation of 
these findings is a lower level of understanding of the relevant tasks in some subject pools.  
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But, we cannot rule out some more fundamental, society-related subject-pool differences (a 
possibility suggested by Herrmann, et al. 2008).   
There is nothing inherently puzzling about one society displaying more extreme values 
of revealed aversion to disadvantageous inequality than another, especially as this aversion is 
inferred from the subject’s strategy as responder in the Ultimatum game.  It may be that, in 
some societies, there is a strong motivation not to leave money on the table, but this can be 
over-ridden by a sense of insult and, if it is, then the opposite reaction is also powerful.  As 
Blanco, et al. (Section 7) notes, the Fehr-Schmidt model can be re-interpreted as an indirect 
reduced-form for reciprocal motivations.  Such motivations could affect the aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality that we infer from the responder’s strategy in the Ultimatum 
game.  Thus, a possible explanation of differences between subject pools in this parameter is 
that they differ either in the strength of their reciprocity or in the consistency across 
individuals of how they balance reciprocal concerns with pure aversion to inequality. 
The interpretation of the Fehr-Schmidt model as a reduced-form for reciprocal 
motivations is also relevant to points discussed earlier.  If the mapping between material 
inequality and reciprocity is sensitive to context, that might contribute to the weak association 
which we find between stated and revealed aversion to disadvantageous inequality.  To the 
extent that positive and negative reciprocity are distinct motivations (as is suggested by 
existing evidence from related ultimatum and dictator games, e.g., Yamagishi, et al. 2012; 
Peysakhovich, et al. 2014), this perspective would also help to explain why positive and 
negative inequality aversion, as revealed in the Blanco, et al. tasks are not strongly positively 
correlated and weaken any expectation that one will always be stronger than the other. 
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Figure 1. Stated Preferences on Aggregate and Individual Levels. Fig. 1A. Utility (satisfaction 
ratings) as a function of difference between own and other payoff in the scenario tasks. Figs. 1B to 
1D. Joint a and b distributions per subject pool.  Each dot represents a participants a and b 
parameters as calculated from their stated preferences in the updated Loewenstein, et al (1989) 
scenario tasks.  (The corresponding individual level data for Loewenstein, et. al. are not available.)  
Observations to the left of the ܽ = ܾ line have ܽ < ܾ.  
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Table 1. Distribution of ࢻ and ࢼ values. BEN refers to the Blanco, et al. (2011) observed distribution 
and F&S to Fehr & Schmidt. The data in these two columns and the row classifications are 
reproduced from Blanco, et al. (p. 325). Percent Well Behaved includes participants who had at most 
one switching point in the Ultimatum Game and at most one switching point in the Modified 
Dictator game. Only these participants are included in the analysis of this paper; all others are 
excluded. 
ɲ F&S BEN Nottingham Izmir MTurk 
ɲф ? ? ? 30% 31% 54% 59% 46% 
0.4 ൑ ɲф ? ? ? ? 30% 33% 18% 12% 17% 
0.92 ൑ ɲф ? ? ? 30% 23% 21% 5% 20% 
4.5 ൑ ɲ 10% 13% 7% 24% 17% 
Mean 
 
1.181 0.754 1.227 1.218 
Median 
 
0.611 0.269 0.026 0.410 
Std. Dev.   1.488 1.198 1.884 1.670 
Chi
2
 test to F&S F 1.790 11.226 37.751 17.211 
  p value 0.618  0.011 0.000 0.001 
Chi
2
 test to BEN F
 
9.014 24.933 9.699 
  p value   0.029 0.000 0.021 
 
ɴ F&S BEN Nottingham Izmir MTurk 
ɴф ? ? ? ? ? 30% 29% 21% 16% 20% 
0.235 ൑ ɴф ? ? ? 30% 15% 25% 11% 19% 
0.5 ൑ ɴ 40% 56% 54% 73% 61% 
Mean 
 
0.473 0.484 0.589 0.512 
Median 
 
0.525 0.525 0.575 0.525 
Std. Dev.   0.310 0.290 0.315 0.302 
Chi
2
 test to F&S F 8.51 3.816 21.517 14.491 
  p value 0.014 0.148 0.000 0.001 
Chi
2
 test to BEN F
 
2.729 5.033 3.109 
  p value   0.256 0.081 0.211 
Total Sample Size 
 
72 104 206 407 
Percent Well Behaved   85% 82% 45% 91% 
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Figure 2. Joint ࢻ and ࢼ Distributions. Each dot represents a participants ߙ and ߚ parameters as 
calculated from their revealed preferences in the Blanco, et al (2011) games. Observations to the left 
of the ߙ = ߚ line have ߙ < ߚ which violates the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumption.  
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Figure 3. Joint ࢇ and ࢻ Distributions. Each dot represents a participants ܽ as calculated from their 
stated preferences and ߙ parameters as calculated from their revealed preferences. The line results 
from the linear regression of ߙ on ܽ.  
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Figure 4. Joint ࢈ and ࢼ Distributions. Each dot represents a participants ܾ as calculated from their 
stated preferences and ߚ parameters as calculated from their revealed preferences. The line results 
from the linear regression of ߚ on ܾ.  
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Table 2. OLS regression analysis of demographic and psychological determinants of stated and 
revealed parameters of inequality aversion.  
 
  a b D E 
Age 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0130 0.0016 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0086) (0.0015) 
Female 0.0014* 0.0045*** 0.1006 0.0674*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.1491) (0.0267) 
Post Secondary -0.0020* -0.0016 0.0670 0.0269 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.2308) (0.0413) 
Economics -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.3219 -0.0939* 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.3098) (0.0554) 
Business 0.0002 -0.0019* 0.1591 -0.0505 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.2115) (0.0378) 
GASP 0.0013*** 0.0016*** 0.0329 0.0572*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0873) (0.0156) 
Izmir -0.0041*** -0.0003 0.4332* 0.0753* 
 
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.2540) (0.0454) 
MTurk -0.0015 -0.0003 0.2382 -0.0239 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.2362) (0.0423) 
Constant 0.0060*** -0.0060*** 0.2695 0.1571* 
  (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.4690) (0.0839) 
N 546 546 546 546 
F (8, 537) 8.88*** 13.53*** 1.46 5.33*** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1037 0.1553 0.0067 0.0597 
GASP denotes the score from the guilt and shame proneness scale by Cohen, et al. 
(2011).  כ ݌ < 0.10,ככ ݌ < 0.05,כככ ݌ < 0.01 
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I. Section SM.1. Further Details on Procedures 
A. Recruitment 
We used ORSEE (Greiner (2004)) to recruit subjects in our Nottingham study.  In 
the UK, students do not typically attend the University closest to their childhood home.  
By restricting our Nottingham sample to UK citizens, we exclude University of 
Nottingham students from other countries. In Izmir, recruitment was done by 
approaching students on campus. This occurred in three primary ways: soliciting 
volunteers from the end of lectures, contacting participants in the school cafeteria and 
other social places, and via posters advertising the sessions.  Recruitment for the MTurk 
subjects was done through the creation of two separate 200 subject MTurk HITS.  
The way that we structure our MTurk HITS is such that subjects find our HIT on 
the MTurk platform, click through a link to Qualtrics where they complete the 
experiment via the Qualtrics survey platform, receive a completion code upon finishing, 
and then return to MTurk where they input the completion code. Seven participants 
completed the entirety of the Qualtrics survey, but returned to MTurk after the first 200 
participants from their respective MTurk HIT had already entered their completion codes 
and so were unable to be compensated for their efforts. These subjects contacted the 
researchers via email and we were able to process their payments via a follow up task. 
In the cases where there was an even number of these special participants they 
were paired together with one other participant from their session and payment was 
calculated according to theiUDQGWKHLUUDQGRPSDUWQHUV¶FKRLFHV,QWKHLQVWDQFHRIWKH
407th subject, we randomly selected one of the first 406 and matched that randomly 
selected subject with the 407th subject calculating payments as if they had actually been 
matched together. We paid the 407th subject according to what they would have received 
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had they actually been matched with the randomly selected subject. We did not double 
pay that randomly selected subject from the original 406 subjects. 
Some MTurk participants started the experiment, but dropped out before 
completing the entirety of it. We were able to observe the decisions of all MTurk 
participants ± both those who completed the task and those who did not ± via the 
Qualtrics software. 430 subjects clicked through the link from MTurk and entered the 
Qualtrics survey. 407 of the 430 (94.65%) subjects completed the entirety of the 
Qualtrics survey and are included in our analysis. 23 of the 430 (5.35%) subjects clicked 
through the link from MTurk, entered the Qualtrics survey, and did not complete it in its 
entirety. 12 of 430 (2.79%) [or 12 of 23 (52.17%) people who started but did not 
complete the Qualtrics survey] did not even begin the Qualtrics survey. The remaining 
11 of 430 (2.56%) [or 11 of 23 (47.83%) people who started but did not complete the 
Qualtrics survey] all completed the Modified Dictator Game after which 2 more dropped 
out and only 9 of 430 (2.09%) [or 9 of 23 (39.13%) people who started but did not 
complete the Qualtrics survey] completed the Ultimatum Game. These 9 eventually 
dropped out and so we did not include them anywhere in our analysis aside from here. 
B. Subject Pool Statistics 
Table SM.1.1 includes subject pool details for subjects included in the analysis; 
that is, subjects who had well behaved preferences (as defined in the main text; see also 
below). The first row gives the proportion of female subjects. Post-Secondary refers to 
any higher education experience. By default all subjects in the Nottingham and Izmir 
subject pools meet this requirement while 82% of the MTurk subjects have had some 
amount of post-secondary education. It has been observed that studying economics or 
EXVLQHVVFDQLPSDFWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDQGIRUWKLVUHDVRQLWLVLQFOXGHGLQRXU
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analysis. The mean and standard deviation of age is given as well as the minimum and 
maximum values.  
Table SM.1.1. Subject Pool Details. 
  
Nottingham Izmir MTurk 
Female 46% 41% 46% 
Post-Secondary 100% 100% 82% 
Economics 15% 16% 1% 
Business 7% 14% 15% 
Age 20.21 21.51 32.94 
 
(1.91) (1.71) (10.12) 
Minimum 18 18 19 
Maximum 29 30 75 
GASP 4.44 5.05 4.89 
 (0.92) (0.78) (0.85) 
Total Sample Size 104 206 407 
Percent Well Behaved 82% 45% 91% 
In the first three sections of the table, subject pool details are given only for subjects 
whose revealed preferences were well behaved. GASP denotes the score from the 
guilt and shame proneness scale by Cohen, et al. (2011). A GASP score = 1 (7) 
indicates low (high) levels of guilt and shame proneness. The fourth section includes 
information about all participants. 
 
C. Order of Tasks 
The order of tasks in our experimental sessions was the Blanco et al. (2011) Modified 
Dictator game and Ultimatum game plus two public goods games (greater details given 
below) followed by the scenario tasks. This order was chosen to preclude spillover effects 
from the scenario tasks into the games. We assumed that spill-overs from games to scenarios 
are less likely than from scenarios to games, but, admittedly, we have not tested this 
assumption. Each participant made decisions in all the roles of each game using the strategy 
method where necessary. A game was randomly selected for payment at the end of the 
experiment (the selection of each game had equal chance, as did each assignment of roles). 
Participants received no feedback until the end of the whole experiment. In the experiment, 
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we measured earnings in points which were exchanged into local currency at the end of each 
session.1 
The public goods games are not analyzed in this paper, but, for sake of completeness, we 
report what we did. Subjects participated in two two-player one-shot public good games 
following the same procedures as Fischbacher et al. (Journal of Economic Psychology 33(4), 
897-913, 2012). In the first public good game ± known as the P-experiment in Fischbacher et 
al. (2012) ± VXEMHFWV¶FRQWULEXtion preferences were elicited using a form of the strategy 
method. In the second public good game ± known as the one-shot C-experiment ± VXEMHFWV¶
report their belief about their co-SOD\HU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQDQGthen their own contribution.  
Subjects did not receive any feedback until after completing the scenario task. The 
feedback they received was twofold: (1) after all the games and scenario tasks were 
completed but before the questionnaire subjects learned which of the four games would be 
payoff relevant (in the Nottingham and Izmir experiments; in the MTurk experiment they 
received this information after completion of the MTurk HIT) and (2) only after completion 
of the questionnaire did participants see feedback and at this time they received feedback 
only on the payoff relevant game (again for the MTurk subjects, they received this 
information after the completion of the MTurk HIT). 
D. Assigning Revealed Preferences Values 
We also follow Blanco, et al. in assigning ȕi=1 (resp. ȕi=0 ) to subjects who always (resp. 
never) choose the equal distribution; and in excluding subjects with multiple switch points in 
the Modified Dictator Game from the analysis. We likewise follow Blanco et al. and assign 
                                                     
1
 In the UK, 1 point = 0.75 pence; in Turkey, 1 point = 1.5 Turkish Lira; and on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 1 
point = 17.5 cents. Exchange rates were chosen to equalize purchasing power as much as possible in the student 
subject pools.  Since MTurk is a naturally occurring work-place, a different payment structure (with a higher 
participation fee) was used, to conform to its conventions.  
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participants who do not reject any offers an Įi=0 and participants who reject every offer 
below the equal split, an Įi=4.5 (although in theory these participants could have Įi
Subjects with multiple switch points in the Ultimatum Game are excluded from the analysis 
in both the main paper and supplementary materials. In summary, subjects were excluded 
from the analysis by having: 
x Multiple switch points in the Modified Dictator Game alone 
x Multiple switch points in the Ultimatum Game alone 
x Multiple switch points in both the Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games 
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II. Section SM.2. Full Instructions of the Experiment 
A. Background 
Included here are the full instructions for the Nottingham subject pool. These 
instructions were based off of those by Loewenstein et al. (1989) for the scenarios and 
Blanco et al. (2011) for the Modified Dictator game and Ultimatum game. Blanco et al. 
(2011) kindly provided instructions and copies of the zTree files which were used in this 
experiment with only minor modifications. The text and all the materials including the 
zTree files for the Izmir subject pool were translated (both forward and reverse) into 
Turkish. In both Nottingham and Izmir, the experiments were conducted by native 
speakers and supervised by one of the authors [Beranek]. The Turkish version of 
scenarios and instructions, as well as all zTree files are available upon request. 
The MTurk participants completed the experiment online using the online survey 
software Qualtrics via MTurk and the text and materials were Americanized. These 
materials are available upon request in the form of a PDF file.  
 
B. Instructions 
Economic Research Project 
You are now taking part in an experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
\RXFDQGHSHQGLQJRQ\RXUDQGRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GHFLVLRQVHDUQDconsiderable amount of 
money. It is therefore important that you take your time to understand the instructions. Please 
do not communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you have any 
questions, please ask us. 
The experiment consists of four different sections. In each section you will be called to make 
one or more decisions. You will have to make your decisions without knowing other 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶GHFLVLRQVLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQV1RWHIXUWKHUWKDWWKHRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVZLOO
not know your decisions either. 
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Only one of the sections will be taken into account in determining your final payoff. This will 
be randomly determined as described below. Each section has the same probability of being 
selected. You should take your time to make your decision. All the information you provide 
will be treated anonymously. 
The section that will be taken into account in determining your final payment will be 
selected as follows. Participant Number 2 was randomly chosen at the very beginning of 
the experiment. This participant will draw a ball from a cloth bag after all participants have 
completed all sections. Each ball in the cloth bag has a different colour and each colour 
corresponds to a different section: yellow, blue, green, and red. The resulting colour and 
corresponding section will be used to calculate your payment.  
The computer will randomly pair you with another participant in the room and will assign the 
roles. The matching and roles assignment will remain anonymous.  You will not know which 
role you were playing until the end of the game.   
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment at a rate of 1 point = 50 
pence. Earnings will be confidential. 
Yellow Section 
In this section the situation is as follows:   
Person A is asked to choose between two possible distributions of money between her 
and Person B in twenty-one different decision problems. Person B knows that A has 
been called to make those decisions, and there is nothing he can do but accept them. 
The roles of Person A and Person B will be randomly determined at the end and will 
remain anonymous 
Before making your decisions please read carefully the following paragraphs. 
The decision problems will be presented in a chart. Each decision problem will look like the 
following: 
Person A's Payoff Person B's Payoff Decision Person A's Payoff Person B's Payoff 
20 0 Left   Right 5 5 
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You will have to decide as Person A; hence if in this particular decision problem you choose 
OHIW\RXGHFLGHWRNHHSWKHSRLQWVIRU\RXUVHOIVR3HUVRQ%¶VSD\RIIZLOOEHSRLQWV
Similarly, if you choose Right, you and the Person B will earn 5  points each. 
You will need to choose one distribution (Left or Right) in each of the twenty-one rows you 
will have in the screen.  If this is chosen as the payoff relevant section, the computer will 
randomly choose one of the twenty-one decisions. The outcome in the chosen decision will 
then determine your earnings. 
The computer will randomly pair you with another participant in the room and will assign the 
roles. The matching and roles assignment will remain anonymous. 
Please note that you will make all decisions as Person A but the computer might assign you 
3HUVRQ%¶VUROH 
If you are assigned the role of A, you will earn the amount that you have chosen for Person A 
in the relevant situation and the person paired with you will earn the amount that you have 
chosen for Person B. 
In the case that you are assigned the role of Person B, you will earn the amount that Person A 
whom you are paired with has chosen for Person B in the relevant situation.  
Blue Section 
In this section the situations is as follows:   
Person A is asked to choose one out of twenty-one possible distributions of money 
between her and Person B. Person B knows that A has been called to make these 
decision, and may either accept the distribution chosen by A, or reject it. 
In the case that PerVRQ%DFFHSWV$¶VSURSRVHGGLVWULEXWLRQWKDWZLOOEHLPSOHPHQWHG
If B rejects the offer, both receive nothing. 
The roles of Person A and Person B will be randomly determined by the computer 
and will remain anonymous. 
Before making your decision please read carefully the following paragraphs. 
In the case that this section is selected to determine your earnings, the computer will 
randomly pair you with another participant in the room and will assign the roles. The 
matching and roles assignment will remain anonymous. 
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You will have to make decisions as if you were Person A and also as if you were Person B. In 
WKHODWWHUFDVH\RXZLOOKDYHWRGHFLGHZKHWKHU\RXDFFHSWRUUHMHFWHDFKRI$¶VSRVVLEOH
twenty-one proposed distributions. 
If you are assigned the role of Person A you will earn the payoff you chose for yourself if the 
Person B that you are paired with accepts your offer. Otherwise, you both will earn nothing. 
If you are assigned the role of Person B, you will earn the payoff that the Person A that you 
are paired with chose for B, only if you had accepted that particular offer. Otherwise, you 
both earn nothing.  
Green and Red Sections 
[These sections were unrelated to this paper.] 
Scenarios and Questionnaire 
Scenarios 
In this section of the project you will read two different scenarios.  After reading each 
scenario, you will learn the outcome of the situation with a variety of payoffs for you and 
another party.  Your task in this section is to rank your satisfaction with the various payoffs to 
yourself and the other party on a scale from very unsatisfied (-5) to very satisfied (5).  Keep 
in mind that the order of the payoffs is randomly displayed, so you should be certain to rank 
your satisfaction of each outcome according to its corresponding payoffs listed to the left of 
the radio button input scale.  
Questionnaire 
While calculating your payoff, we would like to ask you to answer the following 
questionnaire. 
Please answer each of the following questions as accurately as possible. Of course, your 
answers will be treated confidentially. Your honest answers will be of immense value for our 
scientific investigation. Thank you in advance for your cooperation. 
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III. Section SM.3. Determining Stated Preferences of Inequality 
Aversion.  
A. Design of the Loewenstein et al. Experiment 
The scenario tasks provide a near replication of the Loewenstein et al. (1989) (henceforth 
³/%7´Study Two scenario tasks with a few exceptions noted below.  Participants are 
asked to rate their satisfaction for outcomes to two scenario disputes.  Not every participant 
faces the same scenarios; dispute type and relationship condition vary across the treatments.  
The disputes are regarding the gains or losses from disputes involving an invention and from 
the mutual ownership of a plot of land.   
In the original LTB89 paper, the invention scenario regarded the development of cross-
country water skis.  We developed an alternative invention scenario regarding the 
development of a smartphone application which is identical in structure to the 1989 scenario, 
but we expect to be more readily comprehensible to our subjects.   
The relationship condition is either a positive or a negative condition and is elaborated in 
the scenario descriptions. In the MTurk sample, we also included a third condition where 
there was no relationship manipulation; that is, the nature of the relationship was not 
mentioned. We refer to this condition as neutral. 
We made small adaptations to the scenario text to reflect the individual characteristics of 
the subject pools ± we have an Anglicized version for the Nottingham subject pool, an 
Americanized version for the MTurk subject pool, and a Turkish version for the Izmir subject 
pool. The text and all the materials of the Izmir subject pool were translated (both forward 
and reverse) into Turkish. In both Nottingham and Izmir, the experiments were conducted by 
native speakers. The scenario text for the Nottingham subject pool is included below. 
Complete scenario text for the other two subject pools are available upon request. 
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This was a 2x2x2 design and participants were randomly assigned to each dispute and 
relationship condition in such a way that they rated both gain and loss conditions for either 
(a) the invention dispute with a positive relationship condition and the plot dispute with a 
negative relationship condition or (b) the invention dispute with a negative relationship 
condition and the plot dispute with a positive relationship condition.  For each of the four 
scenarios, the task is to rate 21 distributions of payoffs for the subject and another person 
described in the scenario. Each subject is presented with four (out of the eight) scenarios and 
therefore asked for a total of 84 ratings on a scale from -5 reSUHVHQWLQJ³YHU\XQVDWLVILHG´WR
UHSUHVHQWLQJ³YHU\VDWLVILHG´ 
The gain conditions are classified as 300, 500, and 600 received to self while the positive 
outcomes to the other player range from 0 to 900.  The loss conditions are the same unit 
amounts expressed as amounts to pay and not profit.  Following the procedures outlined by 
LTB89, the outcome pairs are randomly ordered to avoid automatic responding. The zTree 
screen shots from the invention dispute as presented to the Nottingham subject pool are 
included below in Figure SM.3.1. 
We also included a neutral relationship condition in the American MTurk sample to see 
what extent the relationship frame impacted utility ratings. In those cases, no relationship 
information was given to the participants. In this case, this was a 2x3x2 design and 
participants were randomly assigned to dispute and relationship conditions. 
 Table SM3.1 summaries the sequences detailing the dispute and relationship conditions 
present in each as well as referencing the output from the OLS estimations which are 
included in the Scenario Estimates tab of the BCG_Data file. 
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Table SM.3.1. Summary Scenario Sequences and Resulting OLS Estimates 
Dispute Invention Plot Invention Plot 
Relationship Positive Negative Positive Negative Neutral Neutral 
Gain 
(21 rankings) Sequence 1A Sequence 2A Sequence 2C Sequence 1C Sequence 3A Sequence 3C 
Loss  
(21 rankings) Sequence 1B Sequence 2B Sequence 2D Sequence 1D Sequence 3B Sequence 3D 
BCG_Data file 
± Scenario 
Estimates tab 
Scen1PosDiff 
Scen1NegDiff 
Scen2PosDiff 
Scen2NegDiff 
Scen3PosDiff 
Scen3NegDiff 
Scen4PosDiff 
Scen4NegDiff 
Scen5PosDiff 
Scen5NegDiff 
Scen6PosDiff 
Scen6NegDiff 
 
x Subjects participated in one of three sequences. In each, they first read the Invention Dispute 
and then ranked their satisfaction with 21 gain distributions (either Sequence 1A, 2A, or 3A) 
and then 21 loss distributions (either Sequence 1B, 2B, or 3B).  
x Next, they read the Plot Dispute and then ranked their satisfaction with 21 gain distributions 
(either Sequence 1C, 2C, or 3C) and then 21 loss distributions (either Sequence 1D, 2D, or 
3D).  
x The sequences varied according to relationship condition: Sequence 1 had a positive 
relationship frame for the invention dispute and a negative relationship frame for the plot 
dispute; Sequence 2 had a negative relationship frame for the invention dispute and a 
positive relationship frame for the plot dispute; and Sequence 3 had neutral relationship 
frames for both (only half the MTurk participants participated in sequence 3).  
x We used each of these rankings as the dependent variable in an OLS estimation for the 
functional form below with the independent variables being own payoff and the difference 
between own and other payoff. Each of the sequences resulted in four different OLS 
parameter estimates (two for NegDiff and two for PosDiff) that can be found in the Scenario 
Estimates tab of the BCG_Data file which is available as a supplementary file in Excel 
format.  
x The two NegDiff (PosDiff) estimates are averaged together between the scenarios in order 
to create the Stated a (Stated b) variables (see discussion in section SM.3.C ± particularly 
page 26 ± for further explanation and Table SM.3.2 for evidence supporting this procedure). 
 
B. Scenario Texts 
The scenarios were structured in the following way: first, the dispute is introduced; 
second, a relationship condition is introduced ± positive or negative (or neutral in the MTurk 
subject pool); third, subjects rank their satisfactions with 21 gain distributions and 21 loss 
distributions. Participants do this entire sequence with two different scenarios for a total of 84 
satisfaction ratings. 
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1. Smartphone App Scenario (Updated 2012 version of the 1989 Patent Scenario) 
with Moderate Relationships, Anglicized 
a. Dispute:  ³One day while eating lunch, a student who lives in your 
residence hall, Charlotte, mentioned to you an idea for a new Smartphone 
app:  a classroom note application for your smartphone.  It is similar to a 
normal word processing app except that you can record lectures, draw 
diagrams, and take photographs of PowerPoint slides all in real time.  
Charlotte thought of the idea several years ago, but had not done anything 
with it and had not been able to interest anyone in it.  You find the idea of 
a classroom note Smartphone app exciting.  You suggest to Charlotte that 
the two of you work together on the project.  Over the next month you 
spend long hours together constructing a prototype of the classroom note 
DSSLQWKHFRPSXWHUURRP6LQFHLWZDV&KDUORWWH¶VLGea, you agree to pay 
the rent for the computer room space while you make the app.  After 
extensively testing and refining the classroom note app at your university, 
you decide that you are ready to submit the app to the Smartphone app 
store.  You complete the Smartphone app store submission, pay the 
registration fee, and send the app in for approval.´ 
b. Relationship: 
i. Moderate positive relationship:  ³Charlotte is a student in your 
residence hall.  You like Charlotte a lot, and other people in the 
dorm also consider Charlotte to be very nice.  Charlotte takes notes 
and picks up assignments for people who miss classes.  Last week, 
Charlotte made all the arrangements for a small hall party and 
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offered her room to you and your out-of-town guest while she was 
away over the weekend.  In short, Charlotte is kind, friendly, and 
dependable.´ 
ii. Moderate negative relationship:  ³Charlotte is a student who lives 
in your residence hall.  You have had several unpleasant personal 
experiences with Charlotte, and other people in the hall also 
consider Charlotte to be quite rude.  Charlotte borrows notes and 
copies assignments, but does not say thank you and often fails to 
return items.  Last week, Charlotte did not show up for an 
important intra-mural tournament game and insulted one of your 
friends.  In short, Charlotte is selfish, irresponsible, and 
argumentative.´ 
c. Outcome: 
i. Gain:  ³Several weeks after you submitted the classroom note app 
to the Smartphone app store, you learn that your Smartphone app 
has not been approved because there are already similar apps that 
do the same thing.  However, the app store has contacted the 
developer of one of these similar apps and she is interested in 
buying one of the innovative features incorporated in your design.  
You and Charlotte agree that the amount offered seems reasonable.  
The two of you negotiate how to split the profit.´ 
ii. Loss:  ³Several weeks after you submitted the classroom note app 
to the Smartphone app store, you learn that your Smartphone app 
has not been approved because there are already similar apps that 
do the same thing.  Nevertheless, you are responsible for paying for 
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the Smartphone app store registration fees.  Both you and Charlotte 
receive copies of this bill and negotiate how to split the cost.´ 
2. Plot Scenario, with Moderate Relationships, Anglicized 
a. Dispute: ³You live adjacent to an empty plot separating you from your 
next-door neighbours to your left.  No one knows who owns the plot, 
despite the fact that you and your next-door neighbours have lived there 
for more than 2 years.  However, the local council recently informed you 
that the plot actually belongs to both you and your neighbours, but the 
percentage owned by each of you has to be negotiated.´ 
b. Relationship: 
i. Moderate positive relationship:  ³The Smiths are your neighbours.  
You like the Smiths a lot, and other neighbours consider the Smiths 
to be very kind as well.  The Smiths always are available to help 
others.  The Smiths are more than happy to water plants and take 
delivery of paUFHOVZKHQ\RX¶UHDZD\/DVWZHHNWKH6PLWKV
loaned you some very expensive tools for a repair project and 
offered their guest bedroom for one of your out-of-town guests.  In 
short, the Smiths are kind, friendly, and dependable.´ 
ii. Moderate negative relationship:  ³The Smiths are your neighbours.  
You have had several unpleasant experiences with the Smiths.  
Your other neighbours also consider the Smiths to be quite rude.  
The Smiths borrow things like tools and dishes, but they do not say 
thank you and often fail to return items.  Last week, the Smiths 
blocked your driveway with their car and threatened to call the 
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police on a small party you were having.  In short, the Smiths are 
selfish, irresponsible, and argumentative.´ 
c. Outcome: 
i. Gain:  ³A third neighbour who lacks a garden has agreed to buy 
the plot.  You and your neighbours would both be happy to have a 
garden between your houses.  You and your neighbours need to 
decide how to split the profits.´ 
ii. Loss:  ³The plot is too small to sell.  However, the local council has 
amassed taxes on the property that you and your neighbours must 
pay.  You and your neighbours need to decide how to split the costs 
of the taxes.´ 
The following Fig. SM3.1 provides an example of the z-Tree screen shots subjects saw in 
Sequence 2. The screen shots of the other sequences are identical except for relevant 
differences in text.  
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Figure SM.3.1. Example Screen shots of zTree Scenario Decision Screens for Sequence 2.  
1. Smartphone App Scenario. a. Dispute and b.ii. Moderate negative relationship
 
Invention Dispute 
 
 
Moderate Negative Relationship 
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1. Smartphone App Scenario. c.i. Gain
 
Gain 
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1. Smartphone App Scenario. c.i. Loss 
Loss 
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2. Plot Scenario. a. Dispute and b.i. Moderate positive relationship 
 
Plot Dispute 
Moderate Positive Relationship 
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2. Plot Scenario. c.i. Gain
 
Gain 
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2. Plot Scenario. c.ii. Loss
 
Loss 
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C. Estimation of ai and bi (the stated advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequality aversion parameters) 
LTB89 specified their model according to three criteria:  goodness of fit, simplicity, 
and flexibility. They examined five functional forms and the functional form that best 
satisfied their specifying criteria was one that included payoff for self and relative payoffs 
(positive and negative differences between own and other payoffs and their squared terms): 
௜ܷ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ܤଵ݈݂ܵ݁ ൅ ܤଶܰ݁݃ܦ݂݂݅ ൅ ܤଷܰ݁݃ܦ݂݂݅ଶ ൅ ܤସܲ݋ݏܦ݂݂݅ ൅ ܤହܲ݋ݏܦ݂݂݅ଶ 
It should be noted that this functional form is quadratic which stands in contrast to the piece-
wise linear nature of the Fehr-Schmidt model.   
LBT89 used DVXEMHFW¶Vsatisfaction ratings of each distribution as the dependent 
variable and then performed an OLS estimation to determine the parameters of the same 
model for each individual subject. Their study includes analysis both on an individual and on 
an aggregate level. LBT89 averaged together all of the individual level parameter estimates in 
order to make aggregate level figures and general statements. 
For each of our subject pools, we IROORZHG/%7¶VSURFHGXUHVDQGalso tested each 
of the five functional forms suggested by LTB89. The same functional form (listed above) ± 
as was the case in LBT89 ± had the best goodness of fit as expressed by highest adjusted R2 
values for all of our subject pools. 
One of the most familiar figures from the LTB89 paper is shown in Figure SM.3.2. 
The notable features of this figure are the tent like structure where highest utility is expressed 
when both payoffs are equal. Unequal payoffs lead to decreases in utility, but these decreases 
in utility are not equal. Utility is reduced more in the region of disadvantageous inequality 
than in the region of advantageous inequality. These are the features that Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) cite as inspiration in the development of different aspects of their model.  
25 
 
Figure SM.3.2.The original quadratic LBT89 functional form expressed as a social utility curve 
emphasizing the importance of relative payoffs.  
 
 
 
However, the Fehr and Schmidt parameters of inequality aversion are not directly 
comparable to the mean parameter estimates in the LBT89 model or the social utility curve 
shown here in Figure SM.3.2. The reason why direct comparison is not possible is because 
the functional form that LBT89 adopt is piece-wise quadratic whereas the model suggested 
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is piece-wise linear. 
In order to make direct comparisons between the stated preferences as expressed in the 
scenarios and the revealed preferences elicited in the Blanco et al. (2011) games, we need to 
specify a piecewise linear functional form that emphasizes the importance of payoff 
differences. We can use the satisfaction ratings of each distribution as our dependent variable 
and then perform an OLS estimation to determine the parameters of a piece-wise linear model 
which is directly comparable to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model: 
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௜ܷ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ݔ௜ െ ܽ௜ ൛ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ ǡ  ?ൟ െ ௜ܾ ൛ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ ǡ  ?ൟǡ ݆ ് ݅        
We estimate these parameter values for both of the scenarios each participant considers and 
then average the parameters together. The resulting averages are what we refer to as each 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VVWDWHGSUHIHUHQFHVRILQHTXDOLW\DYHUVLRQܽ௜ and ܾ௜).  
Some might find this averaging procedure questionable as both the dispute and 
relationship conditions vary between the two scenarios participants consider. A simple way to 
test this would be to look at the individual level correlation of the estimated parameters 
across the two scenarios each participant considered. Significantly high and positive 
Spearman rho values would give support to this technique. Table SM.3.2 shows the summary 
statistics and the correlations between the scenarios subjects considered. In all cases but one 
(that is, in 13 out of 14 cases), there is strong and significant positive correlation between the 
parameter estimates resulting from the satisfaction ratings in the two separate scenarios 
considered by each participant. ,QOLJKWRIWKLVZHIROORZ/%7WRDYHUDJHHDFKLQGLYLGXDO¶V
two parameter estimates to come up with our stated preferences of inequality aversion (ܽ௜ and ܾ௜). 
Figure SM.3.3 shows the estimated linear social utility curves for each subject pool. 
In these figures, the constants are normalized to zero. In these curves, utility is a function of 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ2ZQDQG2WKHUSD\RIIDWYDULRXVOHYHOVRIRQH¶VRZQSD\RII-600, 0, 
600). Figure 1a in the main text is constructed from these same parameter estimates in the 
FRQGLWLRQZKHQRQH¶VRZQSD\RIILV]HURWKDWLV)LJXUH1a is constructed from the middle 
series from each of the four subject pool graphs in Figure SM.3.3. Readers will notice that, 
aside from their linearity, the Figure SM.3.3 social utility curves appear similar to the one in 
Figure SM.3.2 (utility is highest for equal payoffs and disadvantageous inequality is disliked 
more than advantageous inequality).
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Table SM.3.2. Summary statistics and correlations between Loewenstein et al. Dispute Conditions (Participants with Well Behaved Preferences) 
a (negdiff) Correlation between Scenarios 
  Nottingham Izmir MTurk 
Relationship Dispute Type Observations Mean Observations Mean Observations Mean 
Positive Invention 42 0.0102 38 0.0062 90 0.0113 
Negative Invention 43 0.0127 53 0.0103 93 0.0149 
Positive Plot 43 0.0148 53 0.0116 93 0.0155 
Negative Plot 42 0.0155 38 0.0126 90 0.0179 
Neutral Invention     189 0.0125 
Neutral Plot     189 0.0176 
Spearman Correlation ȡ p ȡ p ȡ P 
Positive Invention, Negative Plot 0.6252 0.0000 0.4718 0.0028 0.4909 0.0000 
Negative Invention, Positive Plot 0.6412 0.0000 0.5566 0.0000 0.4748 0.0000 
Neutral Invention, Neutral Lot     0.6109 0.0000 
  
      b (posdiff) Correlation between Scenarios 
  Nottingham Izmir MTurk 
Relationship Dispute Type Observations Mean Observations Mean Observations Mean 
Positive Invention 42 0.00693 38 0.00826 90 0.00981 
Negative Invention 43 0.00050 53 0.00334 93 0.00363 
Positive Plot 43 0.00947 53 0.00964 93 0.01216 
Negative Plot 42 0.00010 38 -0.00343 90 -0.00136 
Neutral Invention     189 0.00824 
Neutral Plot     189 0.00744 
Spearman Correlation ȡ p ȡ p ȡ P 
Positive Invention, Negative Plot 0.4105 0.0069 0.2199 0.1845 0.3069 0.0033 
Negative Invention, Positive Plot 0.6283 0.0000 0.6309 0.0000 0.4337 0.0000 
Neutral Invention, Neutral Plot     0.6256 0.0000 
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Figure SM.3.3. Linear Social Utility Curves. 
 
 
 
LBT89 did not specify a piece-wise linear model and since their individual level data 
are not available we are unable to do so ourselves. We instead constructed a linear social 
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utility curve for LBT89 by separating the social utility curve into two components: one 
component in the domain of advantageous inequality and one component in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality. We then fitted a line to the curve in each component. We used 
the slope of this fitted line as the average parameter estimate for the ܽ parameter and the ܾ 
parameter. As a check for the validity of this approach, we followed the same procedure for 
our Nottingham subject pool (constructing ܽ and ܾ values from the quadratic model that we 
estimated) and we report both the constructed and estimated the values for ܽ and ܾ in Table 
SM.3.3. The differences between our constructed and estimated Nottingham parameters are 
not big and therefore we deem this an appropriate approximation given the data limitations. 
Table SM.3.3. Comparing the constructed parameters to estimated parameters 
 ܽ ܾ 
LBT89 Constructed 0.01111 0.00341 
Nottingham Constructed 0.01334 0.00558 
Nottingham Estimated 0.01331 0.00426 
Izmir Estimated 0.01018 0.00473 
MTurk Estimated 0.01509 0.00703 
 
To see the variation of the parameters of inequality aversion (including the variation 
in stated preferences) by populations, see the Kruskal-Wallis tests below in Table SM.4.1 and 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests in Table SM.4.2. 
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IV. Section SM.4. Supporting Analysis.  
 
The data reported here are available as a supplementary file (BCG_Data.xlsx). 
 
A. Supporting Analysis for Section 3.1. Stated Inequality Aversion 
  
Figure SM.4.1. 2  Expanded Versions of Figures 1B-1D in the Main Text. Joint a and b 
distributions per subject pool. (DFK GRW UHSUHVHQWV D SDUWLFLSDQW¶V a and b parameters as 
calculated from their stated preferences in the updated Loewenstein, et al (1989) scenario 
tasks. Observations to the left of the ܽ ൌ ܾ  line have ܽ ൏ ܾ  which violates the Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) assumption. The left and bottom panel are histograms of the b and a values, 
respectively. 
  
                                                     
2
 In order to document our elicited a and b values, as well as oXUĮDQGȕYDOXHVZHVKRZEHORZexpanded 
versions of Figures 1B-1D and Figure 2. In addition to the scatter plots of the figures in the main text, these 
expanded figures contain histograms of the distributions of the respective values. This exposition is inspired by 
Dannenberg et al. (2007). 
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Nottingham 
  
 
 
87% obey ܽ ൒ ܾ 
 
65% obey ܾ ൒  ? 
 
 
a b 
Mean 0.013 0.004 
Median 0.013 0.003 
St. Dev 0.008 0.008 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ܽƬܾ 
 ߩ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
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Izmir 
  
 
 
77% obey ܽ ൒ ܾ 
 
68% obey ܾ ൒  ? 
 
 
a b 
Mean 0.010 0.005 
Median 0.009 0.002 
St. Dev 0.009 0.009 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ܽƬܾ 
 ߩ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
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MTurk 
  
 
 
80% obey ܽ ൒ ܾ 
 
76% obey ܾ ൒  ? 
 
 
a b 
Mean 0.015 0.007 
Median 0.015 0.005 
St. Dev 0.008 0.009 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ܽƬܾ 
 ߩ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
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We list the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests in Table SM.4.1 indicating that for the most 
part the samples do not seem to originate from the same distribution beyond the 
categorization imposed above.  
Table SM.4.1. Kruskal-Wallis Tests comparing parameters of stated inequality aversion by 
populations 
 
Ȥ2 (2) p 
Ȥ2 (2) with 
ties p 
a (negdiff) 23.858 0.0001 23.858 0.0001 
b (posdiff) 8.779 0.0124 8.779 0.0124 
 
In Table SM.4.2, we list the results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests comparing the 
parameters of inequality aversion bilaterally between populations. We note that significant 
differences exists between all populations with regards to the stated a values. In regards to the 
stated b values, significant differences exist between MTurk and both Nottingham and Izmir 
populations.  
Table SM.4.2. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing parameters of stated inequaliity 
aversion between populations 
 Nottingham MTurk Nottingham Izmir Izmir MTurk 
 
Z p Z p Z p 
a (negdiff) 1.881 0.0600 -2.331 0.0197 4.762 0.0000 
b (posdiff) 2.455 0.0141 0.244 0.8075 2.107 0.0351 
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B. Supporting Analysis for Section 3.2 Revealed Inequality Aversion 
The Chi2 tests listed in Table 1 of the main text compare the distributions of each 
subject pool to the theoretical Fehr and Schmidt (1999) distribution and the observed Blanco 
et al. (2011) (BEN) distributions. Table SM.4.3 shows group Chi2 tests with different 
combinations of groupings. The upper portion of the table involves comparisons to the 
theoretical Fehr and Schmidt (1999) distributions. The lower portion of the table involves 
comparisons to observed data. Various groupings are considered including combining the 
Blanco et al. (2011) observations with our Nottingham observations for a UK university 
group. For the most part group Chi2 tests indicate that our groups are significantly different 
from one another. The exception is greater similarity between groups of observed ߚ 
distributions as opposed to the comparison of observed ߚ distributions to the Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) theoretical distribution. 
Table SM.4.3. Group Chi2 Tests Comparing ࢻ and ࢼ Categories. ࢻ Distributions   ࢼ Distributions 
Comparison to F&S Theoretical Distribution 
Groups: F&S, BEN, Nottingham, Izmir, Mturk 
F 53.982 
 
F 27.562 
p value 0.000 
 
p value 0.001 
Groups: F&S, Nottingham, Izmir, Mturk 
F 45.288 
 
F 24.682 
p value 0.000 
 
p value 0.000 
Groups: F&S, BEN & Nottingham Combined, Izmir, Mturk 
F 44.798 
 
F 24.638 
p value 0.000 
 
p value 0.000 
Comparison to Observations 
Groups: BEN, Nottingham, Izmir, Mturk 
F 34.484 
 
F 11.566 
p value 0.000 
 
p value 0.072 
Groups: Nottingham, Izmir, Mturk 
F 21.476 
 
F 7.950 
p value 0.002 
 
p value 0.093 
Groups: BEN & Nottingham Combined, Izmir, Mturk 
F 25.176   F 8.403 
p value 0.000   p value 0.078 
 
36 
 
We list the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests in Table SM.4.4 indicating that there are 
weakly significant differences between our subject pools in ߚ values; while, the ߙ values do 
not seem to be originating from independent distributions. Note that we include the Blanco et 
al. (2011) data in the first instance and exclude it in the second.  
Table SM.4.4. Kruskal-Wallis Tests comparing parameters of revealed inequality aversion by 
populations 
With BEN Ȥ2 (3) p 
Ȥ2 (3) with 
ties p ߙ 6.033 0.1100 6.215 0.1016 ߚ 7.359 0.0613 7.444 0.0590 
Without BEN Ȥ2 (2) p 
Ȥ2 (2) with 
ties p ߙ 3.308 0.1913 3.422 0.1807 ߚ 6.492 0.0389 6.575 0.0373 
 
The results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests comparing the parameters of inequality 
aversion bilaterally between populations are listed in Table SM.4.5. The ߙ values between 
Nottingham and both Izmir and MTurk seem similar, but there are significant differences 
between Izmir and MTurk. In regards to ߚ values, we note that Izmir is different than both 
Nottingham and MTurk (whereas Nottingham and MTurk are not significantly different from 
one another. 
Table SM.4.5. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing parameters of revealed inequality 
aversion between populations 
 Nottingham MTurk Nottingham Izmir Izmir MTurk 
 
Z p Z p Z p ߙ 0.591 0.5544 -1.432 0.1522 1.739 0.0821 ߚ 0.860 0.3898 2.411 0.0159 -2.195 0.0282 
 
)LQDOO\ZHQRWHWKHVLJQLILFDQWYDULDWLRQLQWKHSHUFHQWRIµZHOO-EHKDYHG¶SDUWLFLSDQWV
in each subject pool with only 45% of our Izmir sample meeting the criteria of well-
behavedness as defined in the main text. Several referees requested information about the non 
well-behaved subjects in Izmir and here we report the proportions excluded for having 
multiple switch points in the various games in Table SM.4.6. 
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Table SM.4.6. Incidences of Multiple Switching in Izmir 
  Modified Dictator Game  
  
Multiple 
Switches Single Switch 
 
Ultimatum 
Game 
Multiple 
Switches 52 17 69 
Single 
Switch 45 92 137 
 
 
97 109  
  
Approximately 25% of subjects in Izmir have multiple switch points for both the 
MDG and the UG. About 22% have multiple switch points in just the MDG compared to just 
around 8% who have multiple switch point in just the UG. Again, 45% have well behaved 
preferences. There seem to be significantly more people who have multiple MDG switches as 
opposed to UG switches. This pattern is true in Izmir (elsewhere) where approximately 3x 
(5x) as many people have multiple switches in the MDG compared to the UG. There are also 
more people who report multiple switch points for both the MDG and the UG in Izmir 
(approximately 25% of subjects from that subject pool) versus elsewhere (approximately 
2%). 
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Figure SM.4.2. Expanded Versions of Figure 2 in the Main Text. Joint ߙ and ߚ Distributions. 
(DFKGRWUHSUHVHQWVDSDUWLFLSDQW¶Vߙ and ߚ parameters as calculated from their revealed 
preferences in the Blanco, et al (2011) games. Observations to the left of the ߙ ൌ ߚ line have ߙ ൏ ߚ which violates the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumption. The left and bottom panel are 
histograms of the ȕ and Į values, respectively. 
 
Blanco, et al. (2011) 
 
 
 
 
62% obey ߙ ൒ ߚ 
 
 
Į ȕ 
Mean 1.181 0.473 
Median 0.611 0.525 
St. Dev 1.488 0.310 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ߙƬߚ 
 ߩ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
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Nottingham 
  
 
 
45% obey ߙ ൒ ߚ 
 
 
Į ȕ 
Mean 0.754 0.484 
Median 0.269 0.525 
St. Dev 1.198 0.290 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ߙƬߚ 
 ߩ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
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Izmir 
  
 
 
41% obey ߙ ൒ ߚ 
 
 
Į ȕ 
Mean 1.227 0.589 
Median 0.026 0.575 
St. Dev 1.884 0.315 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ߙƬߚ 
 ߩ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
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MTurk 
  
 
 
49% obey ߙ ൒ ߚ 
 
 
Į ȕ 
Mean 1.218 0.512 
Median 0.410 0.525 
St. Dev 1.670 0.302 
 
 
Spearman Correlation: ߙƬߚ 
 ߩ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
